想要提高托福閱讀水平，我們一定要在日常生活中有意識地增加英語閱讀量，提升語感和熟練度，這樣才能在實(shí)際托福考試中游刃有余輕松應(yīng)對，這其中比較常用也比較方便地一個(gè)提升閱讀實(shí)力的方式就是利用各類英文報(bào)刊雜志文章進(jìn)行精讀與泛讀練習(xí)。下面我們來看一篇經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人雙語文章：如何及何時(shí)在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目中利用私營資本。
Paying for infrastructure
Private matters
How and when to use private capital in infrastructure projects
為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施買單
私營事務(wù)
如何及何時(shí)在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目中利用私營資本
WHEN the Indiana Toll Road was opened in 1956, there were eight pairs of travel plazas, or rest stops, along the 156-mile (250km) stretch linking Chicago to Ohio and points eastward. As cars became faster and less thirsty, travellers had less reason to stop regularly for petrol or snacks. Three of the travel plazas closed in the 1970s. Restaurants shuttered, even if offered free rent. The remaining plazas, dwindling in number, fell into disrepair. The abiding memory some road users had of Indiana was of grubby toilets along the toll road.
1956年印第安納收費(fèi)公路通車時(shí)，這條156英里(250公里)長、連接芝加哥與俄亥俄州并向東延伸的公路共有16個(gè)休息站。隨著汽車速度提升、耗油減少，旅行者們已不大需要時(shí)不時(shí)停下來加個(gè)油或買點(diǎn)零食了。上世紀(jì)70年代，這些休息站關(guān)掉了三個(gè)。即便免收租金，一家家飯館也關(guān)門大吉。剩下來的休息站則年久失修，并且也在陸續(xù)關(guān)閉。一些旅行者對印第安納難以磨滅的記憶便是收費(fèi)公路邊臟兮兮的廁所。
Those rest-stops are at last getting a makeover. IFM, an Australian infrastructure fund, is investing $34m in the toll-road’s plazas, part of a $200m-plus upgrade. Half of the road’s length, with 57 bridges, is being resurfaced, using a treatment known as “crack-and-feed”, which lasts longer than simply patching the top. IFM, which acquired a 66-year lease on the road in a $5.8bn deal in 2015, says a private-sector operator has the right incentives to invest for the long term. Fewer tyre blowouts mean less gridlock, more road users and more revenue.
如今這些休息站終于要整修一番了。澳大利亞的一家基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施基金IFM向這條收費(fèi)公路的休息站投資3400萬美元，而整個(gè)升級改造工程共將耗資超過兩億美元。占公路總長度一半的路面(包含57座橋)都會重新鋪設(shè)。工程采用的是一種名叫“開槽灌縫”的處理方法，比簡單地局部修補(bǔ)路面效果要更持久。IFM在2015年投資58億美元獲得了該公路為期66年的租約。該基金稱，私營部門運(yùn)營商具備合適的動(dòng)力進(jìn)行長期投資。爆胎的情況減少了，交通阻塞便會減少，公路上的車輛就會增加，帶來的收入也就更多。
Politicians across the spectrum agree on the need to upgrade America’s crumbling roads and bridges. President Donald Trump has promised a $1trn infrastructure package. His commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, is keen to involve the private sector. His vice-president, Mike Pence, was governor of Indiana when the toll-road upgrade was announced. It was not a smooth ride. The 2006 legislation to sell the road barely passed: concerns had been raised that a private owner would cut corners on maintenance and service. Then a plan to levy tolls on a new road built with the privatisation proceeds failed. The debt-heavy consortium which first acquired the Indiana toll road went bust (IFM subsequently bought it). The tale shows the promise of private-public partnership, or PPP, in infrastructure—but also the perils.
不管各自的政治立場如何，政客們都同意美國破破爛爛的道路橋梁需要升級改造。總統(tǒng)特朗普許諾要實(shí)施一萬億美元的基建計(jì)劃。他的商務(wù)部長威爾伯·羅斯(Wilbur Ross)熱切地想讓私營部門參與進(jìn)來。整修印第安納收費(fèi)公路的計(jì)劃宣布時(shí)，副總統(tǒng)麥克·彭斯(Mike Pence)正是該州的州長。這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃并非一帆風(fēng)順。準(zhǔn)許出售該公路運(yùn)營權(quán)的法規(guī)在2006年只是勉強(qiáng)獲得通過：人們擔(dān)心私營業(yè)主會在維護(hù)保養(yǎng)及服務(wù)上偷工減料。之后，另一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃——向一條用私有化的收益修建而成的新公路收費(fèi)——也失敗了。一開始獲得印第安納收費(fèi)公路運(yùn)營權(quán)的財(cái)團(tuán)負(fù)債累累，最終破產(chǎn)(而后被 IFM收購)。從這個(gè)故事可以看出，公私合作制(或稱PPP)參與基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)既有前景，但也存在重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
Linking public-sector need with private-sector capital ought to be a perfect match. Around $2.5trn is spent worldwide each year on roads, railways, ports, sewers, telecoms systems and other infrastructure, but that is still short of the roughly $3.3trn required each year from now until 2030, according to McKinsey Global Institute, a think-tank. The average national shortfall is 0.4% of GDP (see chart). When public finances start to creak, capital spending is often the first thing to go.
將公共部門的需要與私營部門的資金聯(lián)系起來，應(yīng)該會成就一個(gè)完美的結(jié)合。據(jù)智庫麥肯錫全球研究院計(jì)算，全世界每年在公路、鐵路、港口、下水道、通訊系統(tǒng)以及其他基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施上的支出約達(dá)2.5萬億美元，但從現(xiàn)在到2030年，每年在基建上所需的資金約為3.3萬億美元，眼下的支出水平還是不夠。各國基建資金缺口平均占各自GDP的0.4%(見圖表)。一旦公共財(cái)政開始運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)不靈，首先被砍的通常都是資本支出。
Meanwhile, the pitiful yields on government bonds, plus longer lifespans, mean pension funds are desperate for fairly safe assets that offer a stable, inflation-plus return to provide the income they have promised to the retired. The steady, fee-based revenue generated by airports, toll roads, seaports and utilities seems ideal. Asset managers, such as the Ontario Teachers Pension Fund, have built up know-how in infrastructure investment. Others put money to work through specialist fund managers, such as IFM. These have raised more than $260bn over the past decade, including $47bn last year (see chart).
與此同時(shí)，由于政府債券的收益少得可憐，再加上人們壽命的延長，養(yǎng)老基金迫切需要相當(dāng)安全的資產(chǎn)來產(chǎn)生穩(wěn)定、抗通脹的回報(bào)，這樣才可向退休人員支付當(dāng)初承諾的養(yǎng)老金。機(jī)場、收費(fèi)公路、海港以及公用事業(yè)所產(chǎn)生的基于付費(fèi)的穩(wěn)定收入看起來很理想。安大略省教師退休基金(Ontario Teachers Pension Fund)等資產(chǎn)管理機(jī)構(gòu)已積累起關(guān)于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資的專門知識，其他的則通過IFM這樣的專門基金管理公司進(jìn)行投資。在過去十年中，這些機(jī)構(gòu)已募集超過2600億美元的資金，包括去年的470億美元(見圖表)。
PPP thus promises to deal with a host of shortages: of infrastructure; of fiscal space; of long-lived and safe securities; and of aggregate demand and jobs. If it is done correctly, the public users of infrastructure gain from the innovation and efficiency of private-sector firms. But the shortish history of PPP is littered with examples where private provision did not live up to its promises. Problems fall broadly into three categories: the behavioural barriers that turn off consumers; political interests that often turn projects sour; and the difficulty of finding financial and incentive structures that align the interests of all parties.
由此看來，PPP模式有望解決一大堆的短缺問題：有關(guān)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、財(cái)政空間、持久而安全的證券、總需求以及工作機(jī)會等。如果這一模式執(zhí)行得當(dāng)，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的公共用戶便可因私營部門的創(chuàng)新與效率而受益。然而在PPP模式并不算長的歷史中，不乏私營部門在提供服務(wù)時(shí)未達(dá)預(yù)期的例子。問題主要有三類：行為習(xí)慣的阻礙致使消費(fèi)者不買賬、政治利益常令項(xiàng)目狀況惡化，以及難以找到可協(xié)調(diào)各方利益的金融及激勵(lì)架構(gòu)。
Start with public opposition. Anxieties about privatising essential services are present in all countries but tellingly are not always consistent. Britain seems fairly relaxed about private water companies but is cool on privately run toll roads. In contrast, private toll roads are a feature of Australian life but water privatisation remains controversial. A lot depends on what the public has become used to. It is typically more comfortable with the private ownership of telecoms and electricity assets, which is established, than with highways. Yet cable and power networks are at least as critical as roads, perhaps more so.
先從公眾的反對說起。將至關(guān)重要的服務(wù)私有化在所有國家都會引起人們的憂慮，不過這種憂慮在各國顯然并不總是一致。英國人對私營自來水公司的態(tài)度似乎頗為淡定，但對私人運(yùn)營的收費(fèi)公路卻較冷淡。相反，私營收費(fèi)公路在澳大利亞司空見慣，但水務(wù)私營化在該國卻依然會引發(fā)爭議。這在很大程度上取決與公眾已經(jīng)習(xí)慣了什么。與公路私有化相比，他們對由來已久的電信及電力資產(chǎn)私有化要更放心些。但電纜及電網(wǎng)起碼同公路一樣關(guān)鍵，或許還更重要。
Whatever the logic, a touchy public makes for jumpy politicians. A change of administration can often kill a project or drain public support for it. For instance, last year legislators in North Carolina voted down a PPP toll-road project agreed in 2014. It is now under independent review. The East-West link, a PPP toll way in Melbourne, Australia, was cancelled after public opposition. Politicians’ desire for quick results is also at odds with the detailed preparation and long gestation period needed for good infrastructure projects. “Everyone wants to cut the ribbon,” says Kyle Mangini of IFM. “But the political cycle is four to five years while the infrastructure cycle is five to ten years.” Public support for private infrastructure can, however, be built up. Industry experts rave about the “Australian model”, for instance, in which proceeds from privatisations of ports and roads go towards new hospitals, schools and so on.
不管背后的邏輯如何，若公眾難伺候，政客們便會提心吊膽。政府的更迭常常會扼殺一個(gè)項(xiàng)目或耗盡民眾對項(xiàng)目的支持。例如，去年北卡羅萊納州立法者否決了一個(gè)2014年通過的收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目。該項(xiàng)目如今正在接受獨(dú)立審查。澳大利亞墨爾本的收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目“東西連線”(East-West link)也因公眾反對而被取消。此外，政客渴望迅速出成果，而好的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目需要細(xì)致的準(zhǔn)備工作以及長期的醞釀，二者間便產(chǎn)生了沖突。“人人都想剪彩，”IFM的凱爾·曼基尼(Kyle Mangini)說，“但一個(gè)政客的任期是四到五年，而基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的周期則要五到十年。”不過，還是可以想辦法加強(qiáng)公眾對私營基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的支持。業(yè)內(nèi)專家對“澳大利亞模式”大為贊賞。在這種模式下，港口及公路私有化的收益會用于投資新的醫(yī)院和學(xué)校等公共項(xiàng)目。
That leaves the third substantial difficulty, of getting the financial structure of PPP deals right, so that taxpayers, politicians, banks and fund managers are all content. The first need is to work out whether, and how, private capital will provide benefits that public finance cannot. Too often, the main reason for a government to bring in private capital is a bad one: to follow fiscal rules that cap public borrowing or debt. “If the starting-point is to keep a commitment off the public-sector balance-sheet, it’s hard to negotiate a good deal,” says Andy Rose of the Global Infrastructure Investor Association.
還有第三個(gè)大難題，那就是要合理制定PPP協(xié)議的融資架構(gòu)，好讓納稅人、政客、銀行以及基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)都滿意。首先需要弄清的是私營資本是否會以及如何能帶來公共財(cái)政難以提供的好處。政府引進(jìn)私營資本的主要原因通常也是很糟糕的一個(gè)：遵循公共借貸或債務(wù)上限的財(cái)政規(guī)則。全球基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資者協(xié)會(Global Infrastructure Investor Association)的安迪·羅斯(Andy Rose)表示：“如果出發(fā)點(diǎn)是要把一項(xiàng)資本投入排除在公共部門的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表之外，那么就很難在談判中達(dá)成一個(gè)很好的協(xié)議。”
The right way is to allocate risk where it can best be managed. Governments can borrow cheaply. The cost of private capital is higher. Commercial incentives often make private companies better at pushing construction and operating costs down while keeping users happy with the service. PPP typically works best when there is a stream of revenue from fees, road tolls, airport charges or utility bills. It works less well where returns need to be enhanced by a public subsidy, the terms of which are liable to change. And it works badly wherever there are risks that private capital cannot gauge or reasonably bear, such as cost overruns due to delays in regulatory clearance or to “tail risks” which the state simply cannot lay off, such as nuclear decommissioning. Politicians might see PPP as a way of pushing all risks onto private contractors. But the wise ones shun such deals.
正確的做法是將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分配到最能妥善管控風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的地方。政府能夠以低成本借貸，私營資本的成本則較高。由于商業(yè)上的激勵(lì)，私營企業(yè)往往更擅長在保證用戶對服務(wù)滿意的同時(shí)壓低建設(shè)及運(yùn)營的成本。通常，PPP模式應(yīng)用于持續(xù)產(chǎn)生服務(wù)費(fèi)、路橋費(fèi)、機(jī)場費(fèi)用以及水電費(fèi)的地方最為行之有效，而在收益需政府提供補(bǔ)貼的地方表現(xiàn)差些，畢竟補(bǔ)貼政策很有可能會變。一旦出現(xiàn)了私營資本無法估量或合理承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，例如監(jiān)管部門拖延發(fā)放許可造成的成本超支，或是國家無法放手不管的“尾部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”(例如核設(shè)施停止使用后的管理)造成的成本超支，PPP模式的表現(xiàn)就會很糟糕。對政客們來說，PPP模式也許是個(gè)將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一股腦兒推給私營承包商的辦法，但明智的承包商會對這樣的交易敬而遠(yuǎn)之。
There is a spectrum of procurement options. At one end are projects financed from taxes. For instance, last year Los Angeles voted to raise its local sales tax by 0.5% to pay for infrastructure. At the other end are private projects, such as London Gateway, a deepwater port on the Thames built by DP World, a Dubai-based port operator. In between lie privatised utilities that are subject to public regulation; or concessions where a private operator is asked to build, say, a hospital or airport terminal and then operate or manage it for a fixed period in return for the revenue it generates or an agreed fee. Crossrail, a massive project in London (pictured), is an example of another sort of hybrid, where the asset is built by the private sector, but ownership remains public. The right procurement model depends on the individual project, says Mr Rose. Ultimately, however, the taxpayer pays, whether in taxes, fares, tolls or bills.
進(jìn)行基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)有一系列的采購選擇。最保守的選擇是利用稅收為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施提供資金。例如，去年洛杉磯通過表決，將消費(fèi)稅提高0.5%來支付基建費(fèi)用。最激進(jìn)的則是完全私營的項(xiàng)目，例如倫敦門戶港(London Gateway)。這是迪拜的港口運(yùn)營商環(huán)球港務(wù)集團(tuán)(DP World)在泰晤士河建設(shè)的一個(gè)深水港。介于兩種方案之間的是受到公共監(jiān)管的私營公用事業(yè)，或者特許經(jīng)營權(quán)。所謂特許經(jīng)營權(quán)，就是讓私人運(yùn)營商來建造例如一所醫(yī)院或航站樓，接著在固定期限內(nèi)對其進(jìn)行運(yùn)營或管理，以此換取該設(shè)施產(chǎn)生的利潤或之前商定的費(fèi)用。倫敦的一項(xiàng)龐大工程“橫貫地鐵”(Crossrail，如圖)則屬于另一種性質(zhì)的公私合營：工程由私營部門負(fù)責(zé)建造，但所有權(quán)仍歸公共所有。羅斯說，到底哪種采購模式為好，要視具體的項(xiàng)目而定。不過，歸根結(jié)底買單的還是納稅人，不管是以何種形式買單——交稅、付車費(fèi)和過路費(fèi)，還是付賬單。
The PPP model, though more established in Australia, Britain and Canada, is slowly gaining adherents in America. One example is the new terminal at La Guardia airport in New York. Will Mr Trump’s infrastructure plans give PPP a big push? The only specific detail that seems to be agreed on is a tax credit for equity investors. But a shortfall of private capital is not the main bottleneck, says the head of the PPP infrastructure business at a big construction firm. Rather, pots of money are chasing a paucity of projects that are ready and fit for private-sector participation.
PPP模式在澳大利亞、英國和加拿大更為成熟，在美國也慢慢贏得了支持者。紐約拉瓜迪亞機(jī)場的新航站樓便是一個(gè)例子。特朗普的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施計(jì)劃能否大大推進(jìn)PPP模式?看上去，目前唯一商定下來的具體細(xì)節(jié)就是針對股權(quán)投資者的稅收抵免。不過，一家大型建筑公司的PPP基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施業(yè)務(wù)部門負(fù)責(zé)人說，私營資本短缺并不是主要的瓶頸。相反，有大筆的錢在追逐著已準(zhǔn)備好且適合私營部門參與的零星項(xiàng)目。
A lot of groundwork, such as environmental studies and detailed risk-assessments, are needed before a private company will bid on a project. One reason Canada and Australia have a good record on infrastructure is that they have agencies dedicated to grooming projects. It is far harder to get projects going in America, where contractors must deal with a plethora of regulators in different departments, both federal and local. Streamlining planning and permits is painstaking work. Does Mr Trump have the patience for it?
在私營公司投標(biāo)一個(gè)項(xiàng)目之前，需要做大量的基礎(chǔ)工作，例如環(huán)境研究和詳細(xì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評估。加拿大和澳大利亞之所以在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施方面取得了良好成績，一個(gè)原因就是它們有專門從事項(xiàng)目培植的機(jī)構(gòu)。在美國推進(jìn)項(xiàng)目要困難得多，承包商必須要應(yīng)對聯(lián)邦和地方層面各個(gè)部門的大量監(jiān)管者。精簡規(guī)劃和許可流程不是輕松的工作，特朗普有耐心去做嗎?
